The success of the US-Iran agreement will depend less on the symbolism of its signing than on the ability of both sides to bridge gaps in expectations during its implementation, writes Manal Lotfy

The preliminary agreement between the US and Iran, which has been hailed by US President Donald Trump as a decisive triumph, is less a final settlement than a truce papered over by a memorandum of understanding (MoU) so skeletal that its primary achievement is to defer the very conflicts it purports to resolve.

Described by US Vice President J D Vance as a “very general” document of roughly a page and a half, the accord is built upon a scaffold of ambiguity that will inevitably be stress-tested during the “technical negotiation phase” scheduled to follow its formal signing in Geneva on Friday.

Both Vance and Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, are expected to attend. “On a number of ​issues, ​we are ​going to ​have to figure ​this ​stuff out during the technical negotiation phase,” Vance said.

While the reopening of the strait and the lifting of the naval blockade offer immediate and tangible relief to global energy markets, the agreement’s foundation remains porous. Riddled with 14 points of contention, the MoU could threaten to collapse once the ceremonial ink is dry.

The absence of detailed negotiations on core issues such as the nuclear programme, the future of Iran’s ballistic missiles, and the precise nature of sanctions relief means that the real bargaining has yet to begin. This creates a vacuum that will almost certainly be filled by hardline interpretations on both sides.

US officials have confirmed that the Strait of Hormuz will reopen on Friday, the same day the agreement receives its formal signature in Geneva. The announcement arrived as Trump attended the G7 Summit in France, where a special session on Iran featuring the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, and the UAE took place on Tuesday.

On Monday, following talks with French President Emmanuel Macron, Trump declared of the preliminary deal that “I am very happy to say it’s signed — the deal is all signed. And the Strait is already partially opened.”

 “I think a lot of great things are going to happen in the Middle East right now. And very importantly, oil is plummeting and the stock market is shooting up like a rocket today,” he said.

On Tuesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that the first round of talks with the US would address issues such as the status of the Strait of Hormuz, the US naval blockade, and post-war reconstruction. In subsequent phases, he added, negotiations are expected to focus on Iran’s nuclear programme and sanctions relief, matters that both sides hope to resolve in a final agreement.

Araghchi also cautioned that any Israeli attack on Lebanon or continued military presence on Lebanese soil would constitute a breach of the agreement with the US.

“The important point I want to emphasise is that, in our view, this memorandum involves two parties — on one side, the US and Israel; on the other, Iran and Hizbullah,” Araghchi stated.

An Arab diplomat based in London told Al-Ahram Weekly that he did not believe an agreement between the US and Iran would have been possible without the contribution of regional actors. Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar, he said, have played a pivotal role in narrowing differences and helping to overcome the deep-seated mistrust that has long characterised relations between Tehran and Washington.

“If the current approach, one that incorporates regional states into the detailed technical negotiations, continues, the agreement stands a strong chance of succeeding and being implemented in a manner that enhances both regional and international security,” he said.

He noted that the gravest threats to the agreement stem from efforts by Israel and influential figures on the American right to derail it. “Are we witnessing the beginning of a new chapter? Yes, provided the agreement succeeds. The region is eager to see that happen and will work to ensure its success, because war comes at a tremendous cost.”

According to officials, any sanctions relief or asset unfreezing will hinge upon Tehran’s fulfilment of its commitments under the accord. The core of the agreement, as articulated by US officials, is a “pay-for-performance” model: Iran will be welcomed back into the global economy only in exchange for verifiable commitments to regional stability and nuclear non-proliferation.

However, the “performance” itself is subject to wildly divergent interpretations. The 14-point draft, as reported by Iranian media, outlines a maximalist vision that includes a permanent ceasefire on all fronts, a US commitment to non-interference, and the delivery of at least $300 billion in reconstruction aid. This plan is described as a non-obligatory fund from “regional partners”.

Yet for regional powers, it creates a uniquely challenging dynamic, as Iran’s neighbours are demanding clear security guarantees before making the substantial financial contributions expected of them to improve the security environment in the region.

Crucially, Tehran insists that its missile programme and support for regional proxy groups are “red lines” and non-negotiable in a position starkly at odds with Washington’s stated goals.

On the nuclear issue, the document commits Iran to reiterating its long-standing pledge not to produce nuclear weapons, but it is notably silent on the curtailment of enrichment activities, leaving the fate of its 60 per cent enriched uranium stockpile to future and likely contentious negotiations.

This inherent ambiguity is a recipe for future discord: the US views the agreement as a framework that can be hardened into concrete restrictions, while Iran sees it as a victory that enshrines its nuclear rights.

Perhaps the most glaring fault line lies in the economic architecture of the deal, which is built on promises that are as vague as they are vast. Iran has reportedly secured a commitment for the release of up to $24 billion in frozen assets, with half released before the final negotiations even begin.

However, Vance denied that Iran will receive “billions of dollars of assets”. He told the CBS Mornings TV programme in the US that while the US is “open to a lot of things that are on the table”, the $24 billion figure “just doesn’t appear anywhere in any of the texts that we’ve talked about with the Iranians.”

The agreement’s structural weakness is further exposed by the inclusion of last-minute clauses regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Trump publicly declared the strait would be “toll free”. However, a last-minute revision inserted a reference to the “future administration of maritime services” by Iran and Oman, allowing Tehran to impose a fee regime by framing it as charges for “safety and navigation services”.

While the agreement includes a comprehensive ceasefire across all fronts, including Lebanon, it explicitly does not mandate the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has capitalised on this ambiguity, declaring that Israeli forces will remain in security zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria “for as long as necessary”, while also announcing his intention to run for re-election.

Hizbullah has welcomed the deal as a victory that reflects Iran’s commitment to ending the war but has warned it will not accept any attacks on Lebanese sovereignty.

Ultimately, the agreement’s success hinges entirely on its implementation in a process that will be immediately tested by clashes over the release of frozen funds, the administration of the Strait of Hormuz, nuclear restrictions, regional security arrangements, the future of Iran’s proxy networks, and the extent of a ceasefire that Israel has already signalled it will test.

By postponing decisions on the most contentious issues to a subsequent phase of negotiations, the agreement’s success will depend less on the symbolism of its signing than on the ability of both sides to bridge significant gaps in expectations during its implementation.

For the US, the accord offers an opportunity to reduce the economic and political costs of continued confrontation. For Iran, it provides the prospect of economic reintegration while preserving key strategic interests.

Whether those competing objectives can be reconciled remains uncertain.